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Introduction
Terrorists are typically viewed as romantic idealists or mindless
predators. Rationality based approaches to terrorist behavior have correspondingly not been attempted. Terrorist movements vary greatly in composition, objectives and strategy. Yet terrorism, like more conventional
warfare, can be understood as politics pursued by other means. Accordingly, political economic models of international conflict can be applied to the
strategies of terrorist alliances, albeit with diminished empirical utility owing to the shadowy character and small numbers of their quarry.
Since Mancur Olson's pioneering work in the mid 1960's, the economic
theory of collective (or "public") goods has been used with varying success
to describe all sorts of political activity and inactivity. Olson and others
have often treated the international security provided by peacetime alliances
as a collective good. Yet these scholars have not applied their frameworks to
the fighting conducted when alliances are actually employed in wartime; nor
have they considered the special problems nonstate alliances have in collectively waging their conflicts. This paper will briefly outline the collective
goods paradigm and its previous employment in studies of defense policy.
Further, we will suggest how these concepts could describe terrorist
movements.
Collective Goods
In his seminal The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson develops
the collective goods approach previously suggested by Head, Musgrave,
Samuelson, and other economists. Olson applies the concept to such
behavior as political lobbying, the formation of labor unions, international
alliance behavior, and even the revolution of the proletariat.'
Purely collective (or public) goods can be distinguished from private
goods by their nonexclusivity and nonrivalness. Private goods are exclusive
and rival since the consumer of a particular good can exclude others from
its consumption and since his or her consumption leaves a smaller quantity
of the good to be consumed by others. For example, a consumer's purchase
of a Cabbage Patch Doll, given a (perhaps artificially) limited supply of the
good, leaves one less doll to be enjoyed by others. The consumer, moreover,
can and probably will exclude others from using his or her doll. National
defense, in contrast, is consumed equally by all within a polity (though not
all may desire the same amount of defense) and none can be deprived of its
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benefits. The supply is similarly nonrival since the addition of an individual
to the polity and his or her consumption of its defense does not leave less of
the good to be enjoyed by others.
Since none can be excluded, all within a polity will benefit from the
provision of a collective good whether or not they contribute their share to
cost of the good. In a large community, moreover, an individual's contribution to the provisiort of a collective good will have no recognizable impact
on its supply and hence provide little strictly utilitarian incentive for the individual to contribute. This is not to say that nonrnaterial, or in economic
parlance, "nonrational" incentives are not important. 2 Still, in these large
or "latent" groups, many will free ride, enjoying the benefits of the collective good without paying their fair share for it. Olson therefore argues that
collective goods provided by and for large communities will normally be
provided in a severely suboptimal quantity (and may not be provided at all)
unless individuals are coerced to contribute or given selective incentives only
available to those who do contribute. 3 Mandatory taxation is an example of
the former. The magazines, special insurance policies, trips, and other selective incentives offered to members of unions and various lobbying organizations are examples of the latter. Apparently, few farmers, factory workers,
or others will join organizations which could yield their groups great
benefits unless they are coaxed by selective incentives or intimidated in
various ways some not unlike terrorism.
This simple understanding leads to interesting propositions about actor
size and organization formation. Most important, large actors may have
sufficient incentive. to provide a collective good benefiting many others
simply because they have so much at stake and since their resources are sufficient to provide all or most of the cost of the good. For example, Olson
and Zeckhauser found that the larger members of the NA TO alliance bore a
disproportionate share of the cost of the common defense. The large had
less to gain from driving a hard bargain and more to Jose from withdrawal.•
Other researchers have extended this analysis, finding that different
types of NA TO defense expenditures are more or less collective in nature
and accordingly more or less susceptible to the free-riding of the small. For
example, the airports, roads, and other infrastructure costs of the alliance
provide many distinctly national benefits. It is therefore not surprising that
the small members of NA TO fully shoulder their fair share of these
burdens. 5

The Political Economics of Fighting Alliances
Despite the various applications of collective goods theory to alliance
behavior, none have applied the paradigm to the actual fighting conducted
when alliances are employed in wartime. This is largely because victory in
war, unlike national defense in peacetime, is a good so highly valued that
any increase in national income will be devoted to its provision. 6 Within
very loosely joined or even essentiaily hostile alliances systems, very different processes may be at work. Within these alliances, the exhaustion of
allies may be a good valued nearly so highly as the eventual defeat of the
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collective foe. Free-riding might occur, for some members will make
calculated effort to allocate a disproportionate share of the costs of the conflict to their allies. For example, revisionist historians have suggested that
the Anglo-American refusal to set up a second front against the Nazis until
late in World War II reflects a deliberate effort to bleed the Red Army white
in its struggle against the Germans and thereby facilitate the AngloAmerican domination of postwar Europe .'
Our previous theoretical work suggests that such tendencies may be
pronounced within guerrilla alliances or other alliances composed of
nonstate actors. Nonstate allies are particularly unlikely to be well united in
the pursuit of victory. If they are essentially revolutionary rather than nationalist movements, they will lack an acceptable prewar status quo from
which to gain precedents for the postwar distribution of stakes. All the
rebels are after the total control of the same government, and in the past
many fully successful revolutions have served as a prelude to a far bloodier
struggle determining who holds final power. 1 It has been suggested that
Lenin had this in mind when he held back his Bolshevics from participating
in the March 1917 revolution against the Czar. He thereby conserved his
forces while the Liberals lost troops in the revolution, leaving themselves
ripe for defeat in the fall. 9
In extreme cases, one coalition member could even betray another. For
example, it has been suggested that during the Vietnamese revolution
against France, the Communist Party gave the French secret police a list of
Nationalist Party leaders, even though the Communists and Nationalists
were loosely allied at the time. 10

Terrorismand GuerrillaConflict
In our previous work we have suggested that, particularly within guerrilla alliances, collective warmaking can be seen as a collective good subject
to the free-riding common to such goods. The same may not be quite so true
of terrorist alliances.
Terrorism is often th9ught of as guerrilla war; indeed, the two terms
are often employed interchangeably. In contemporary debate it is typically
assumed that both are modern conflicts waged by revolutionary forces using hit and run tactics to wear down and eventually def eat the superior
forces of the reactionary state. In fact, both guerrilla war and terrorism date
back to ancient times. The Chinese empire faced essentially guerrilla war in
defeating peasant revolts as early as the Fourth Century B.C .. The Jewish
Maccabees fought a successful guerrilla war against the Syrians in the Second Century B.C., and the Roman Empire defeated guerrilla movements
undertaken at various times by the Jews, North Africans, and
Celtiberians. 11 Similarly, Rapoport notes that the Zealots-Sicarii employed
terrorism against the Romans and moderate Jewish leaders in the First Century A.O., and the Thugs have used terror against individuals for thousands
of years. 11 Moreover, no ideology holds a monopoly on either strategy. ·
Skilled guerrillas now fight Marxist regimes in Angola and Afghanistan,
and one of the most successful (though losing) guerrilla struggles of all time
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was fought against the French Revolutionary government by the rightist
peasants and nobles of the Vendee region. The Black Hundreds, Nazis,
KKK, and other reactionary groups have with varying success employed terrorism or spawned terrorist movements.
What then, are these phenomena? Guerrilla warfare denotes tactics
employed by forces which cannot profitably meet the enemy in a conventional battle because they are outgunned. The Guerrillas therefore employ
relatively small scale assaults on weak enemy positions, fequently disbursing after an attack. Their very weakness dictates a larely nocturnal strategy
most active in remote regions where forests or rough terrain hinder the
dominate army in its search and destroy missions. Successful guerrilla
forces develop "liberated zones" under their authority. These regions serve
symbolic purposes, provide training grounds, supply food and other
materials, and give fighters a refuge. Victorious guerrilla forces (and few
are victorious) must eventually form units large enough to fight conventional battles. Guerrillas can never defeat a determined enemy without
reaching this stage. 11
Terrorism denotes the killings, bombings, robberies, kidnappings, hijackings, and other destructive acts committed by small groups or individuals aimed at overthrowing or influencing the regime. 14 (Notably,
some of these activities, particularly robberies, can also help keep the terrorists in business.) Terrorism may be employed against specific targets
linked to the offending regime or movement. Just as typically it is employed
at random, to undermine regime authority by making it clear that the
government cannot protect its citizens. ' '
Terrorism may act as adjunct to a guerrilla movement. For example,
the Viet Cong quietly assassinated thousands of South Vietnamese village
leaders in the 1950's and 1960's to remove the indigenous nonCommunist
leadership. 16 Terrorism cannot on its own win power however, for by
definition terrorism employs forces far too small to directly combat the
state. Notwithstanding current speculation about nuclear terorism and the
optimistic Narodnaya Volya belief that government would fall if a few
leaders were eliminated, terrorism has never toppled a regime by itself. The
most it has managed has been to help make liberal democracies less liberally
democratic or (usually unintentionally) helped authoritarians overthrow
such relatively benign regimes. The highly active leftist Uruguayan and
Argentine terrorists of the l 970's, for example, only succeeded in provoking
rightist military coups against the rather democratic governments of their
nations. The new military regimes then fought ruthless (and successful)
"dirty wars" against the terrorist movements. 11

The Rational Terrorist
Terrorist acts may be motivated by material or purposive incentives.
(Terrorist groups are often held together by social ties, yet these incentives
do not in and of themselves require terrorist acts for fulfillment.) As Laqueur details, many modern day terrorists are sponsored by governments.
Libya, Iraq, Iran, South Yeman and various other states have subsidized
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terrorists or even paid for them to handle specific jobs. The infamous
"Carlos" and certain other terrorists and terrorist trainers are distinguished
by their Swiss bank accounts and other benefits provided by governments
who make use of their skills in furthering national foreign policy goals and
enhancing international prestige. Such a nominal world power as Libya, for
example, has gained considerable influence by sponsoring various
movements. 11 While normally motivated at least partly by ideological concerns, it cab be suggested that these terrorists are as much mercenaries as
freedom fighters.
International terrorists employed or supported by governments can
find refuge within those nations. Even if apprehended, they may well serve
only a few years provided that they ply their trade within relatively liberal
states. 1' Terrorism can therefore offer good employment for the utility
minded soldier.
These relatively utilitarian terrorists may work together with other
groups at times. Yet profiteering fighters are apt to lack a meaningful long
term program separate from that of their sponsors . Arrangements between
these terrorist groups will therefore be set up to tackle a single act in a contractual manner rather than to independently conduct an allied campaign
against the same enemy state. The respective inputs of personnel for each
act are thus known. Ironically, free-riding among such groups is therefore
not possible, at least partly because of the rationality of the terrorists and
calculability of inputs, outputs, and inducements.
More typical terrorists are motivated by essentially purposive aims.
This is particularly true of those operating within a single authoritarian or
totalitarian state. Such terrorism holds great risks and no material rewards
save the occasional take from a bank heist or kidnapping. Even then,
repressive governments are apt to treat anti-state robbers far more harshly
than common criminals, making politically justified crime a far riskier profession. Of course, this is not always the case in more liberal states. Indeed,
in these nations apprehended terrorists may be treated more humanely than
ordinary criminals since it is assumed that they acted for reasons more noble
than personal gain. In addition, since liberal states see nonviolent pressures
as legitimate, they may also view violent political activity in a more restrained fashion than nonliberal states and may even give in to certain
pressures in hope of buying them off in the same manner that nonviolent
pressure group s can be pleased. For some purposively motivated terrorists,
terror is an end in itself. Indian Thugs, for example, killed as a religious
sacrifice to Kali, who derived satisfaction from the suffering of the victim
and dedication of the murderer. 20 More recently, Fanon has suggested that
the mere act of violence against an "oppressor" is emotionally liberating. 21
In addition, it must be suggested that at least some terrorists derive pleasure
from the adventure of their activity. For participants with these primary
motivation s, no coalition partners are necessary. If coalitions do occur, no
partner will seek to avoid activity, for participation itself is the goal,
whatever its cost. Similarly, these groups are unlikely to be appeased by inducement offers from their targets, for their aims are by nature intangible.
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Terrorism is more typically employed as a means to the end of altering
government policy (as in anti-abortion bombings or bombings protesting
American involvement in Vietnam) or eventually taking power by destroying the government leaders or mass confidence in them. This basic proposition has important implications for the political economy of terrorism.
First, those protesting particular policies can often be appeased by concessions, particularly if the sacred policies are singular in nature and not linked
to a broad ideology. Further, even in relatively liberal states where terrorists
are not likely to meet death or torture, those so determined as to employ terrorism are either abherent personalities, or, more often, motivated by deeply help ideals which tolerate little deviation. Either way, it is not surprising
that broad terrorist "movements" (e.g., the PLO, the IRA, the
Weathermen and Yippies, etc.) are typically well splintered alliances of narrow factional groups. This has implications for coalitional behavior within
such alliances, for free-riding or even betrayal to the state authorities can be
expected.
In radical perspectives, free-riders are moderates who choose less risky
(and less violent) means of carrying out the struggle against the regime. For
example, in the Introduction to his Terrorism and Communism Trotsky
condemns the followers of Kautsky, who refrains from and advises against
violent revolutionary action. Though not always in support of terrorism,
Lenin similarly attacks the Mensheviks for their moderation in the
struggle. 22 Similar denunciations of moderates have been made by rightist
and nationalist terrorists. In the eyes of radicals, violent action is necessary
for meaningful change. Those individuals and groups which do not assist in
terrorism and revolt are simply free-riding off the efforts of others by
avoiding the risky contributions to social transformation while being
perfectly ready to benefit from it if it comes to pass. 13
Betrayal is of a somewhat different character. It can be suggested that
the aforementioned hostility extremist groups hold for their natural allies
encourages betrayal to the authorities. For example, factions within the
broad Armenian ASALA terrorist organization regularly betray other factions to Western authorities and even engage in acts of terror against
them. 24 The Vietnamese case mentioned above can also be cited, and it is
hardly surprising that terrorist groups confide little in their allies even where
police penetration is not feared. In other instances moderate supporters of
the cause may betray terrorists to reach accommodation with the regime or
because they themselves fear the extremists. In a somewhat different vein, it
can be suggested that terrorists may wish the destruction of other antigovernment groups since those groups compete for followers during the
struggle and could well compete for power should the antigovernment activity ever succeed. 25 Given these incentives for betrayal, it is not surprising
that a determined and united secret police or military can generally learn a
great deal about a terrorist group and destroy it. As Laqueur's work notes
time and time again, terrorists operating within a single regime, particularly
an oppressive one, usually have short life spans whatever their level of
popular support or ideological merit. This seems less true of ethnic groups
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than of fundamentally ideologicai ones, perhaps because ideological
motivations are inherently more subject to disagreement (and corresponding problems of collective action) and less apt to gain widespread support.
It can be suggested that Marxist theory, at least, takes some notice of
these factors . Communist political and military organizations attempt to
gain dominance over their leftist (and other) allies and integrate them into a
''united front'' before fully pressing the battle against the government. 26 As
Marx's reflections about the Paris Commune make clear, he distrusted
allies and was keenly aware of the difficulties of coordinating a proletariat
represented by more than one organization. 2' Lenin's views on the subject
have already been noted, and the united front strategy could be interpreted
as a means to eliminate rational free-riding or betrayal on the part of allies.

Conclusion
Political Economic approaches hold considerable power in explaining
the micro level organization of interests. In addition, these analyses have
been usefully employed to describe the behavior of international military
alliances operating in peacetime. Political economic thinking has not been
used to analyze fighting alliances, but we maintain that under certain circumstances nations and organizations will free-ride off their allies in collective warmaking. This is particularly tru·e of the nonstate alliances employing
terrorism or fighting guerrilla wars.
From our standpoint, terrorism differs most from guerrilla war in its
smaller probability of winning power. It is not surprising that many
terrorists---some of them essentially mercenaries---are not clearly after taking over government. This is important since the incentives which drive terrorists have implications for combatting them. For example, if nations band
together to liquidate mercenary terrorists even within their sponsor states,
this activity will no longer offer adequate economic rewards and will probably diminish. Of course, such anti -terrorist activity can itself be considered
a collective good subject to considerable free-riding on the part of nations.
Moreover, such activity is unlikely to succeed so long as a large number of
states tacitly approve of (even if they do not support) terrorists with foreign
policy goals congruent to their own.
Other terrorists are motivated by the thrill of action or the joy of
violence against an "oppressor." Again, more aggressive pursuit of terrorists could have some deterrent effect. Yet the nature of these motivations
suggests that these forms of terrorism will be difficult to stop since the act
of terror is an end in itself rather than a means to make money or alter
policy.
Perhaps most typically, terrorists use their acts as a means to an
ideological end. In these cases, moderates can often be coopted or convinced to leave the struggle and betray radicals to the regime (or at least
"free-ride" off their violent cohorts) if certain concessions are granted
them even as the state acts aggressively against the terrorists. Even when
there are no moderates, the splintered nature of militant ideological
organizations suggests that factions will often betray their allies, or at least
22

not greatly assist other groups under attack. The regime should, and usually
does, foster the various divisions among these groups. Unfortunately (or
maybe not), nationalist movements are far less likely to suffer the divisions
of ideological organizations. This, combined with their mass base, makes
them more difficult to repress.
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